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Summary 
Previously known blind signature systems require an amount of computation at 
least proportional to the number of signature types, and also that the number of such 
types be fixed in advance. These requirements are not practical in some applications. 
Here, a new blind signature techruque is introduced that allows an unlirmted number of 
signature types with only a (modest) constant amount of computation. 
Background 
The notion of “blind signatures” was first introduced in [Chaum 821. Such systems 
typically have a party called the s i p e r  who is able to make certain digital signatures. The 
other parties, called providers, would like to obtain such signatures on messages they 
provide to the signer. What makes it interesting is that the providers wish to keep the 
signer in the dark as much as possible. Since the signatures will in general ultimately be 
shown widely, it is assumed that the signer wdl learn them. What providers can keep 
from the signer, however, is the exact correspondence between the actual signing 
operations performed by the signer and the signatures which are later made public. This 
essential property of blind signatures is called “unlinkability.” 
Shamir & Adleman 781. As is usual for such systems. the signer chooses two appropriate 
large primesp and q, and makes their product n public. In a slight generalization, which 
wdl be important later, the signer then issues 1 “public exponents’’ e 1, ..., el. The signer 
further computes corresponding “secret exponents” d i ,  ..., di satisfying d, = e,’ 
(mod ( p  - l)(q - l)), 1 < i  <Z. The signature of “type” i is formed on a number m by the 
signer as m’, 3 m4 (mod n). Anyone can use the public n and e, to verify the signature 
of type i on m by checking that m E (m’,)e’(mod n) holds. 
The first actual realization of a blind signature system [Chaum 851 worked as 
follows: The provider “blinds” a message m, using a key k chosen uniformly from 
{ l,..,n}, producing r G [m]ke‘  (mod n), where the square brackets indicate the input to 
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Blind signatures can be made using the RSA public key signature system [Rivest, 
228 
the transformation. The signing of t yields t = [mke‘]dl = m4 k (mod n). Then the 
provider “unblinds” this returned f by forming m’, 
easy to see informally why the unlinkability property mentioned above holds. The signer 
knows two sets: the set of signed blinded messages f (or equivalently to the signer, t)  and 
the set of signed messages m’, (or equivalently, m,). For any particular t‘ and m’, that the 
signer suspects might correspond, the signer is able to determine exactly one k E fmf17 
(mod n) that would have been the provider’s secret blinding key if they did in fact 
correspond. But since the k‘s are chosen independently and uniformly by the providers, 
the signer learns nothing about whether any guessed correspondence holds. 
[ m d f k ] k - l  G mdr (mod n). It is 
Notice that a provider must “anticipate” the particular d, that will be used by the 
signer. It is possible, though computationally expensive, for the provider to actually 
anticipate a few d, at once by forming t mreIeZ (mod n) for example, and being able to 
unblind in case of signature with dl or dz by forming mfl G (mrele2)d1 r - e 2  (mod n) or 
m f 2  
respectively. But such an approach becomes prohibitively computation intensive as the 
number of alternatives increases: in general it requires the provider to perform more than 
one multiplication for each alternative anticipated (since each e, should have a distinct 
prime factor, otherwise some signatures can be made from others). Such effort required 
to anticipate a l l  possible signatures may not be practical, and is also undesirable because 
the maximal extent of a system has to be fixed initially and effort proportional to this 
limiting size must be carried out during every blinding. Such an approach of course 
becomes impossible in practice when the number of alternatives is too large or when the 
alternatives are not known in advance of blinding. 
system described in [Chaum 851. This would allow customers of the bank providing a 
system to each supply a large number of blinded items when their accounts are opened, 
without the customers knowing in advance whch particular type of signature will later be 
applied by the bank. Not only can this provide economy of data transfer, but it protects 
the bank‘s customers from being able to (and hence from being coerced into) making 
payments that they cannot later trace. When the bank ultimately issues signed notes, its 
choice of signature type may be used, for example, to encode denominations and 
expiration dates. Another application of blind signatures is to credential systems. In 
these, each different kmd of credential a person receives is encoded as a digital signature 
of a corresponding type formed on a blinded copy of the person’s “digital pseudonym” 
used with the signer [Chaum 85; Chaum & Evertse 861. There may be a great many 
Merent kinds of basic and more detailed credentials, and the future requirement for such 
credentials could be dficult to anticipate. Thus there appears to be a substantial need 
for blind signatures that are unblindable even after an unanticipated signature type has 
been applied. 
(mre~e2)d2 -el (mod n), depending on whether d 1 or d2 was used to sign, 
The ability to anticipate a large number of signature types can benefit the payment 
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Blind unanticipated signature protocols 
The new blind signature protocols presented here are based on the use of certain 
called generurors. These wiU be made public in units (of the residue classes modulo 
advance, and their signatures will also be made public by the signer. Unlinkability 
requires that the group they generate contains all messages m (otherwise certain linkings 
are easily ruled out because there is no k capable of causing them). Depending on how 
this requirement is ensured, as will be described later, the blind unanticipated signature 
protocol will have one of three forms. 
In the first and simplest form of these protocols, the following congruences hold: 
t = [m]gk (mod n) 
t' [ ~ g ~ f ' ( r n o d  n) 
m' = [(mgk)"]g-"(mod n), 
where: m is the message to be blinded: t is the blinded form of the message; t' the 
signature computed for t ;  m' the unblinded signed m; g the generator; n the publicly 
known modulus; ei and di the public and private signature exponents, respectively; and k 
the provider's secret blinding key, say chosen uniformly from { 1, . . . , n } . The square 
brackets again show the input to the transformation whose output is shown on the left- 
hand-side, and thus they d e h e  the function of each of the three transformations in the 
order shown: blinding, signing, and unblinding. 
In the second form of the protocol, the following congruences hold: 
k t = [m]g I k2 (mod n) 
t' e [mgk' k2I4(rnod n) 
m' G [ ( ~ ~ ~ ' k r ) ~ ] g - ~ ~ ~ k r ( r n o d  n), 
where blinding key k 1 is chosen as k was above, but blindmg key k2 is chosen uniformly 
only from the pair { 1, n - I}. 
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In the third and most general case, the following con-pences hold: 
m‘ = [(mgl k l  g2 k2 . . .g:)d’]gF4kl ...g;‘k’(mod n), 
where each ki is a secret b h d i n g  key chosen independently as k was above. 
Testing a generator knowing the factorization 
If generators for the whole group are known, then unlinkabdity can be maintained 
without any restriction on the messages that can be signed. Having the factorization of 
p - 1 and q - 1 allows efficient verification that a particular proposed set of generators do 
in fact generate the whole group of units modulo n. (Of course these factorizations also 
allowp and q to be computed easily.) Suppose, for example, that GCD(p - 1, q - 1)=2 
and q = 3 (mod 4) (which is quickly checked by comparing the factors of p - 1 and q - 1) 
and that g and - 1 are to be verified as generating the whole group (so that the second 
protocol above can be used). Then it is sufficient to venfy that the order of g is maximal 
modulo one factor of n, sayp, and that it generates exactly half the elements modulo the 
other. This is readily accomplished: first raise g to p,T ( p  - 1) and ensure that no 1, 
1 d < k ,  gives the result 1, where the pi, 1 < i  <k,  are the prime divisors of p - 1; perform 
the same procedure also for the odd primes dividing q. 
Hiding the factorization with physical security 
The above approach works fine if you know the factors, but how can it be used by 
the signer to convince providers without revealing the factorization? A possible solution 
allows anyone to submit to the signer a physical device for conducting the above test. 
The signer would give the secret parameters to the device and allow the message 
containing the logical result (“verifies” or “does not verifi;”) to be sent by the device to its 
supplier. Tns should be done in a way that convinces the supplier that the signer cannot 
falsify the message, while not allowing the device to leak the secret parameters. One way 
to arrange this is as follows: The supplier creates a number c’ at random, applies a 
publically known and agreed on one-way function f, which is preferably one-to-one, to c’, 
yielding c = f(c’); installs c’ and n in the device: and gives c to the signer along with the 
device. Then the signer isolates the device from the supplier and feeds it the secret 
parameters ( p  and 4). Only if the result is “verifies” does the device output c‘. The 
signer then applies f to the output of the device, and checks whether the result is c, and if 
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so returns this c’ to the supplier. The device is constructed to be tamper resistant enough 
to make it sufficiently difficult for the signer to obtain c’ from it in the expected time 
interval, unless the generator tester yelds “verifies.” 
Linear cut-and-choose on moduli and generators 
In another approach, a prospective signer announces moduli n,, 1 =Gi <k, and 
corresponding generators g, for each (the “cut”). Others detennine the single modulus n 
among these that will be used (the “choose”), whereupon the signer must make public the 
factorization of the p l -  1 and the 41 - 1, 1 <I <j and /+i, for all j moduli except the ith 
one selected. Then anyone can use the verification techques described above (which rely 
on possession of the secret) to venfy ail the other moduli and corresponding generators, 
thereby obtaining the probability 1 - j  - that the selected modulus would also verify. 
Such techniques can of course also be used in a great many situations, as is well known in 
the folklore. One way to select i would be by a public coin-tossing event. Another way 
to determine i requires each of some set of persons to form a b’ at random and a 
corresponding b = f(b’) using a preferably bijective, public one-way function f. Then 
each participant makes public their b. Once every b is public, the b’ are revealed, 
checked, and added modulo the number of moduli j ,  yielding the index i. A disadvantage 
of these techniques, compared to the previous approach based on physical devices, is that 
they are not “open” to new participants once the cut-and-choose is completed. 
Generators not manipulable by the signer 
Yet another way for providers to gain confidence in the suitabllity of generators is 
for the generators to be determined in a way that cannot easily be manipulated by anyone 
including the signer. Generators could be chosen by a random process, such as those just 
described for selecting a particular modulus. Use of a single such randomly chosen and 
untested generator might not give a high enough probabhty of providing adequate 
unlinkability; use of several randomly chosen generators improves the degree of hiding 
and unlinkability. For instance, it can be shown that use of 22 generators provides a 
probability of roughly one-millionth that not all blinding factors in the reduced residue 
system modulo n are generated. When additional t h g s  are known about the structure of 
n, the probabllities improve greatly and less generators need be used. Examples include: 
when n has exactly two prime factors each congruent to 3 modulo 4 (whlch can be 
demonstrated efficiently by a protocol presented by [Peralta & v.d. Graaf 871) and / or 
when ( p  - l)(q - 1) has no small odd divisors (as is easily checked by asking the signer to 
sign random values using signature types with small prime ei). A further variation 
chooses subsets of a set of generators in a key-dependent way. 
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Ensuring that messages blinded are powers of g 
This final approach does not require verification or special selection of the 
generator(s): protection against linking is provided by almost any generator(s). Security 
derives from testing whether the thing to be signed, m, is a member of the group 
generated by the generatorts). Th.~s can be used when the signer itself forms m as rn = g” 
(mod n), where x is chosen at random by the signer (such as is the case in the setting of 
[Chaum & Evertse 861). Then the signer can participate in a protocol to convince the 
provider that some x satisfying the congruence is known to the signer. The first protocols 
for demonstrating such “possession of a discrete log” are presented in [Chaum, Evertse, 
v.d. Graaf & Peralta 861, and a potentially more efficient version allowing many m’s to be 
verified at once is presented in [Chaum, Evertse & v.d. Grad 871. 
Un lin kability 
It seems that all blinding factors cannot be equally hkely, since otherwise the 
provider would have to choose the exponents from a distribution depending exactly on 
LCM(p - 1, q - 1). But it is easy to see that choosing the k’s udormly from 
{ 1, . * . , n2} for instance gives a maximum difference in the probability of any two that 
is less than n -2,  which would be quite adequate in practice. 
Open problems 
A much cleaner and more general approach might be found. Notice, for example, 
that if ( p  - 1) / 2 and (q - 1) / 2 are primes, then any g piith Jacobi symbol - 1 (which 
can easily be checked knowing only n) together with - 1 generates the whole group (apart 
from a few exceptional cases that immediately reveal the factorization of n). Thus, a 
protocol allowing anyone interacting with the signer to check that n is of such a form 
without learning its factorization allows generators of the whole group to be verified 
directly. Any such open protocol for establishing a pair of generators (preferably one of 
which is - 1) would of course be quite desirable. 
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